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Koskenniemi’s Images of the International
Lawyer
SAHIB SINGH∗
Abstract
In this article I excavate and critique two dominant images of the international lawyer that
emerge from the oeuvre of Martti Koskenniemi. In doing so, I hope to brieﬂy shake the faith
critical international legal thought so often invests in the potential of the subject. The ﬁrst
image is of the critical subject that emerges from From Apology to Utopia. She also happens to
be a projection of the critic, governed by both elitism and unhappiness, for whom freedom
is always both a constant and overarching possibility, and yet always embodied in a ﬂeeting
moment. By way of critique, I question whether this critic(al subject) may not unwittingly
embed the very aspects of liberal legal and political thought that she seeks to challenge. The
second image is of the professional lawyer, left on the shores of pragmatism. She emerges from
my reading of Koskenniemi’sTheGentle Civilizer, the 2005 Epilogue and his Kantian texts. She is
constructed as Koskenniemi’s critique is domesticated, taking a last, and perhaps futile, refuge
in an ethics that is needed to buttress an identity which can aid international law’s moral
regeneration. Koskenniemi’s writings urge today’s international lawyers to put their sense of
identity into question; this article asks which identities (and their possibilities) he embeds as
he does so.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
ExperiencingMarttiKoskenniemi’s texts is akin towhat I imagineGregor Samsa felt
at the beginning of Franz Kafka’s The Metamorphosis. Samsa, a travelling salesman,
awokeonemorning thinkinghewashuman, only to discover his bodywasnow that
of an insect.1 This is a moment about knowing you are not what you understand
yourself to be. The displacement and discomfort that accompany this experience is
precisely what has allowed Koskenniemi to reinvigorate the discipline. It has been
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Amsterdam in April 2014 and Boston College Law School in November 2014. In addition to the participants,
I would like to thank Pamela Slotte,Walter Rech, James Crawford, Juan Amaya-Castro, Geoff Gordon, Claire
Vergerio, Wouter Werner, Ukri Soirila, Barrie Sander, John Haskell, Jean d’Aspremont, Jan Klabbers, Gleider
Hernandez, Luca Bonadiman and Anne van Mulligen, as well as the Journal’s two anonymous reviewers.
Everyone’s comments, helpful criticismsandgeneralwillingness tobearwithmeshapedmuchof this article.
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for themost part a tortuous journey through apathy, marginalization, engagement,
misunderstanding, trenchant resistance, polemics, and perhaps ﬁnally, acceptance
through subsumption. Possibly in spite of this journey or because of it, Kosken-
niemi’s texts have ﬁrmly arrived into the canon of international legal thought.
At the heart of this lies From Apology to Utopia. A text that changed what it is
possible to say within the discipline and how it is possible to say it. No small feat.
Critical thought has, in part, founded its success upon its relentless willingness to
intertwine epistemological concerns with ethical ones. Readers are reminded that
international law is made, and re-made, through the commitments and choices
of its participants. It is we who are responsible for the choices we make amidst
the anxieties and uncertainties of living in a conﬂictual world.2 But like all forms of
knowledgeandpolitics, critical thoughtalso inscribescertain images, characteristics
and attitudes of this ‘we’.3 In short, it presumes, shapes and imposes certain images
of the international lawyer. And in Koskenniemi’s texts, ranging from FromApology
toUtopia,TheGentleCivilizer,4 tohiswritings onKant,we seenumerous imagesof the
international lawyer. Some hidden, some put front and centre and others sutured
through his texts.
In this article I excavate, problematize and critique these images of the interna-
tional lawyer. A particular series of questions guide this article. What images of
the subject are required by, but not always made explicit within, the text?5 What
characteristics and attitudes, or subjectivities, are rhetorically assumed, created and
perpetuated by his texts? And are the subjects that emerge capable of realizing the
politics of critical thought? These questions help me to explore several identities
that have become integral to the discipline’s imagination in recent decades.
The ﬁrst is the critical subject, and as we shall see, this is also a projection of the
critic. Hence the designation critic(al subject). She emerges frommy reading of From
Apology to Utopia in Section 2 and is a subject who is governed by both elitism and
unhappiness, for whom freedom is both a constant and overarching possibility, and
yet is always embodied in a ﬂeeting moment. This dominant image emerges after I
excavate the assumed and presupposed subject behind the intellectual vehicles that
drive Koskenniemi’s text.6 I then question whether this critic(al subject) may not
unwittingly embed theveryaspectsof liberal legal thought that it seeks to challenge.
In Section 3, we see different images of the professional. The dominant image
is one of a lawyer left on the shores of pragmatism who takes refuge in an ethics
that may shore up an identity necessary for international law’s moral regeneration.
This image emerges from my reading of The Gentle Civilizer, the epilogue to the
republishedFromApology toUtopia, and those texts that relate toKoskenniemi’s turn
2 M.Koskenniemi,FromApology toUtopia: TheStructure of International LegalArgument.ReissuewithNewEpilogue
(2005), 542–8, 614–17.
3 S. Critchley, Inﬁnitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance (2008), 103.
4 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (2001).
5 U. Eco, The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts (1979), 10–11.
6 P.Allott,Eunomia:NewOrder for aNewWorld (2001), 24–6 (paras. 2.26–2.30) (referring to the ‘geneticmaterial’
of an idea).
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to Kant. Each text is treated as distinct, with its own theoretical and metaphysical
presuppositions, but also aspart of a collective endeavour and the sameproblematic.
To speak of a ‘subject’ is not to speak of a natural individual, but rather one that is
created and sustained by a discourse upon which she is dependent. It preserves her
whilst initiating and sustainingher desires andagency.7 A formofpower constitutes
her and her capacities. The discourses and practices of critique is such a form of
power. But like most discourses and practices, different and at times conﬂicting
images of the international lawyermay emerge. It is by better grasping the dominant
images within critical thought, as well as the possibilities created by contrasting
and conﬂicting images, that wemay be able to re-envision our own role with it. It is
for this reason that it is useful to look to Koskenniemi’s texts, some of which have
become inﬂuential – even part of what is unconsciously presupposed or assumed,
rather than what is questioned – in certain corners of the discipline.8
There is also a second reason for this article. In contemporary legal thought
there is a tendency to always consider the subject as part of the solution. It is a
tendency shared by traditional liberal and critical theories alike. In the rhetorical
form that tends to structure most texts, as well as the psychology of normative
legal thought – the ‘problem→solution’ split – the subject nearly always ends up
occupying the latter position. Problems are normally seen to lie outside the subject,
often in speciﬁc practice structures or processes, and on occasion within certain
modes of thought. There is no motivation to explore the possibility of problems
lying within speciﬁc images of the subject, or ourselves as trained international
lawyers.9 Where critical scholarship has breached this threshold, and considers the
way we think of ourselves, our subjectivity, it still ultimately ends up investing the
potential of its emancipatory politics within speciﬁc images of the subject. These
patternsof thoughtdeserveattention.Of courseany speciﬁc formofpolitics requires
a subject and often presumes her into existence. My hope, here, is to shake – and
perhaps reinvigorate – the faith that is often invested in the potential of the subject
within critical international legal thought.
2. THE CRITIC(AL SUBJECT)10
It is a rare breed of book that causes consternation in the ranks whilst also inspir-
ing a generation. James Crawford, then holder of the Whewell Chair, introduced
the work of Koskenniemi at the annual meeting of the American Society of Inter-
national Law by saying the latter had shown ‘with overwhelming erudition the
7 J. Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (1997), 2; M. Foucault, ‘The Order of Discourse’, in R.
Young (ed.),Untying the Text: a Post-Structuralist Reader (1981), 51.
8 D. Kennedy, ‘The Last Treatise: Project and Person (Reﬂections on Martti Koskenniemi’s From Apology to
Utopia)’, (2006) 7German Law Journal 982, at 991.
9 P. Schlag, ‘The Problem of the Subject’, (1991) 69 Texas LawReview 1627, at 1702 (noting this problemwithin
the American critical legal studies tradition).
10 This section is largely based onmy chapter inW.Werner et al. (eds.),The Law of International Lawyers. Reading
Martti Koskenniemi (forthcoming, 2016).
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impossibility of our discipline’.11 But hadn’t Koskenniemi sought to expose the dis-
cipline’s conditions of possibility in From Apology to Utopia, rather than render it
to the mercy of nihilism? Hadn’t he sought to shake the complacent intellectual
foundations of the discipline, seeking to preserve it whilst transforming the way its
participants thought of it? Interpretations vary. Perhaps part of the problemwas the
text’s form.12
Its intellectual vehicles are important (Section2.1).Whilst theynodoubt contrib-
ute to themisunderstanding and domestication of critique,13 the text’s theories and
methods betray its dominant subject. The image of the subject the text presupposes
is to be found by better understanding these theories andmethods. In short, the crit-
ical subject is the subject the text requires in order to perform as it does. And as we
shall see this is also a projectionof the critic; a reproduction of the author’s self-image.
It is a subject that is deeply rooted in a Sartrean metaphysic – governed by elitism,
unhappiness and speciﬁc ideas of freedom (Section 2.2). Perhaps more importantly,
this subject may not be capable of realizing the political project of critique in the
1980s. I argue that this subject is torn between certain antinomies and that inmany
key respects reﬂects the subject at theheart of liberalpolitical thought.Notonlymay
From Apology to Utopia be structured by opposing philosophies of freedom, hence
bringing into question its emancipatory politics, but it may very well enable the
very form of liberal politics that it wishes to challenge (Section 2.3).
2.1. Critical Knowledge:Method and Theories
Critical international legal thought has no allegiance to a given method or theory,
for this may betray a form of reiﬁcation.14 Indeed Koskenniemi has argued that the
merit of anymethodor theory (or ‘style’ as hewouldprefer) lies in the strategic use it
is put to.15 For this reason we see considerable eclecticism in his use of theories and
methods, as well as shifts in theoretical posturings across his oeuvre. This diversity
has allowed him to enrich what has traditionally been a theory-averse discipline.
But there is almost certainly a common commitment to anti-formalism andwhat is
known as the broad church of ‘critical knowledge’.16 This form of knowledge seeks
to bring about structural change in a given social system by bringing an awareness
of one’s concrete social reality. This in turn enables forms of transformative action.
The point is to try and change the world. And the kernel of emancipatory politics
that lies at the heart of this form of knowledge is intimately tied to how the subject
may come to see her own freedom.
11 J. Crawford, Introductory Remarks toMartti Koskenniemi’s, ‘TheWonderful Artiﬁciality of States’, in (1994)
88 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 22, at 22.
12 See the comments of Robert Jennings in A. Cassese, Five Masters of International Law (2011), 145–6.
13 S. Singh, ‘International Legal Positivism and New Approaches to International Law’, in J. d’Aspremont and J.
Kammerhofer (eds.), International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (2014), 291–313 (exploring various
techniques of disempowerment under the guise of discussion).
14 D. Kennedy, ‘Spring Break’, (1985) 63 Texas Law Review 1377; M. Koskenniemi, ‘Letter to the Editors of the
Symposium’, (1999) 93American Journal of International Law 351.
15 Koskenniemi, supra note 14, at 356.
16 M. Horkheimer, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ in Critical Theory: Selected Essays (2002), 188–243.
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From Apology to Utopia is committed to a number of methods and theoretical
predispositions in pursuit of its emancipatory politics. The majority of the text is
the demonstration of a formal structuralist method (Step 1). Koskenniemi attempts
to show that professional international legal discourse is constructed around binary
opposites that reﬂect the tensions found in liberalism. Whilst these opposites are
mutuallyexclusive, theycanalsoonlygain theirmeaningby relyingoneachother.17
Theyare irredeemablyinterdependent.18 International legalargument interminably
oscillates between these poles and this structural indeterminacymeans that a given
legal question cannot be answered by reference to only international law. If a given
argument is to prevail it has to be infusedwith, ormotoredby, political,moral, social
(etc.) contexts.
This structuralism is deployed as a form of critical knowledge, whose task is ‘to
undo thenaturalness of conventionalwaysof thinking about the law.’19 Step1 is em-
ployed to unmask and undo the ‘false consciousness’ of then existing international
legal thought (Step 2).20 Clearly inﬂuenced by the critical theory of the Frankfurt
School, Koskenniemi attempts to subvert the ‘truth’ claims of liberal political and
international legal thought. Liberalism’s attachment to law’s objectivity and its
primacy over politics is cast aside as a form of false consciousness – as a naturalized,
given way of thinking. The indeterminacy thesis demonstrated by the text’s applic-
ation of structuralism seeks to unravel international law’s claim to objectivity and
undoes its false consciousness, so that this claimwill now ‘appear as contingent and
contestable, [so that] the actual will manifest itself in a new light’.21
Both Koskenniemi’s structuralism and his ideology critique are a form of polem-
ics. This adversarial approach is softened by what is an ‘indissociable’22 aspect of
his text: the ideals of community and intersubjectivity (Step 3). The indeterminacy
thesis leads us to the conclusion that any international legal argument must ﬁnd
its justiﬁcation in a contestable political choice. In this way the conﬂictual and
paradoxical nature of liberal politics ﬁnds itsway into international legal argument.
However, critical practice ‘attempts to reach those conﬂictual views, bring themout
into the open and suggest practical arrangements for dealing with conﬂict without
denying its reality’.23 This normative practice urges us to ‘slowly proceed towards
(instead of promising to realize at once) decreasing domination and increasing a
sense of an authentic community between disagreeing social agents’.24 I will ex-
plore whether this normative practice is feasible given the negative moment of
17 It is not a deconstructionist method as some authors assumed (before critiquing the book on this basis)
(see, e.g., I. Scobbie, ‘Towards the Elimination of International Law: Some Radical Scepticism about Sceptical
Radicalism’, (1990) 61 British Yearbook of International Law 339). Koskenniemi has often referred to adding
a ‘deconstructive’ technique to his structuralism (not to mention that these referrals always use inverted
commas), butwas all too aware thatmanywouldnot classify it as such (Koskenniemi, FromApology toUtopia,
supra note 2, at 10 and fn. 8). See also Singh, supra note 13, 296–9.
18 Koskenniemi, supra note 14, at 355.
19 Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 541.
20 Ibid., at 537–41.
21 Ibid., at 540.
22 Ibid., at 541–8.
23 Ibid., at 544–5.
24 Ibid., at 547.
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Koskenniemi’s critique, and if so, whether it leads us to a deepening of liberal ideals
through an arrested critique.
Finally, Koskenniemi argues for a critical identity for the international lawyer.
She must be capable of acting in a conﬂictual world. Here, international lawyers
are socialized agents, performing speciﬁc roles within speciﬁc routines, shaped by
speciﬁc contexts (Step 4). But these both constrain and enable the international
lawyer. She is a situated agent for whom it must be ‘possible to live in the present
without losing the sense of the beyond’.25 Critical normative practice requires this
particular subject. Andwhilst he only brieﬂy elaborates this subject, it seems neces-
sary for him to ‘outline for the lawyer an existence in routinewhich constantly aims
at transforming the contextwhich shape it and an intellectual directedness towards
context-transformation without losing touch of its embeddedness in routine’.26
As we follow these methodological and theoretical steps through the text, it
becomes apparent that From Apology to Utopia is deﬁned by a speciﬁc paradox. Its
entire critical project depends on the potential of the subject and yet it furnishes us
with no analytical knowledge of her. As we move from structuralism to ideology
critique, to intersubjectivity and to socialization, the subject rises to a certain prom-
inence within the narrative. We become aware that Koskenniemi’s emancipatory
politics cannot do without her. She is capable of transcending her own situation by
recognizing herself as a reiﬁed individual, thereby changing how shemay act in the
world, and of constantly realizing her freedom; of bringing a sense of community
and authentic commitment to the lives of actors who are constantly in conﬂict and
disagreement; and of acting within but being able to constantly transform one’s
context in a given social role. The hitherto invisible subject is doing all the work.
And yet we knownothing about her. Nonetheless, Koskenniemi’s text seduces us to
simply invest in her potential.
2.2. The Critic(al Subject)
Let me begin by shedding light on the images of the international lawyer. There
are two ‘subject-types’ at play within From Apology to Utopia. On the one hand
there is the socialized international lawyer who is tasked to carry out a critical
normative practice (see Step 4 above). Then there is the subject who can realize
and overcome the thought-structures that have so far deﬁned her existence. This
image of the subject is presupposed and required by Koskenniemi’ critique. She is
also the result of the critique that is performed throughout his text. And ﬁnally, she
is a projection of the critic – a replication of the author’s self-image. Images of this
subject are repressed, comprising the text’s unconscious: a driving force that refuses
articulation. But perhaps most importantly, she is also recursively played out in
other parts of critical international legal thought. She emerges fromKoskenniemi’s
structuralism and ideology critique. In these steps we experience the reproduction
25 Ibid., at 548.
26 Ibid., at 549.
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of the subject found in Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialist philosophy.27 In Sartre, as in
Koskenniemi’s text, we see an individual who can always transcend her situation
in reality, rather than only as some ontological condition. The critical international
lawyer may ﬁnd absolute freedom in the sphere of critical rational consciousness
rather than in a freedom conditioned bymaterial reality. Let me explain.
Koskenniemi, like Sartre, begins by developing an unbridgeable separation
betweentheworldandthe individual.That isbetweenobjectandsubject, orbetween
doctrine and lawyer. From Apology to Utopia dedicates most of its pages to a struc-
turalist method that focuses on the ‘object’ side of the analysis (doctrine, cases,
arguments). Unsurprisingly, its scientiﬁc method suspends nearly all references to
thesubject,whoseactivitymayconstitute suchobjects,orwhominturnsuchobjects
may constitute.28 The purpose of this is not to render the subject irrelevant, but to
expose the varied and contradictory positions that an international lawyer can take
within thediversityof international legal discourse.29 Theanalytical structureof the
book reinforces a splitting between subject and object (whilst also making a normative
argument that denies the possibility of this; see Step 4 above). This ‘splitting’ is then
recursively solidiﬁed in Koskenniemi’s images of the critic(al subject).
In From Apology to Utopia this subject is able to stand above and separate from,
albeit momentarily, her object. She is deﬁned by an attitude of reﬂection upon her
own situation, as well as upon herself. She is able to reﬂect on her own and her
ﬁeld’s reiﬁed situation (because critique has done itswork). She is able to see herself,
and her fellow travellers, as managing technicians in a thingiﬁed system of rules.
And she is able to transcend this understanding of herself, moving towards her own
possibilities. She is able to discern all this because she can detach herself from the
(international legal)world she ﬁnds herself in. Critique promises her the capacity to
capture and see her ‘real’ situation, through the momentary distance that critique
gives her fromher false understanding of theworld. She is able to see all this because
there is a brief ‘moment’ and ‘space’ that is immune from context, from structure,
from her technical role, from her beliefs etc.
Now notice how this image of the subject is almost identical to the critic. Except
the critic’s operation is performed before this subject comes into view. The critic is
able to stand above and separate from his object of analysis.30 With his interrogative
attitude, he is able to discern that international law works according to a determin-
able structure of argument, at a given historical moment. He is able to discern the
patterns of structurewithout having to be constituted by this structure. He is able to
reﬂect uponhis ownandhisﬁeld’s reiﬁed situation as amere collectionofmanaging
technicians working in a thingiﬁed system of rules. He is able to transcend this un-
derstanding,moving towards its possibilities. He is able to discern all of this because
27 In this section I rely heavily upon, but go beyond, Pierre Schlag’s argument regardingAmerican critical legal
thought; see generally Schlag, supra note 9, at 1679–1705.
28 A. Supiot, Homo Juridicus: On the Anthropological Function of the Law (Saskia Brown (tr.), 2007), 6: ‘A truly
scientiﬁcmethod aims to efface the subject in favour of the object and cannot therefore explainwhat founds
the subject’.
29 See M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, (A. Sheridan Smith, (tr.), 1972), 200. For the inﬂuence of
Foucault on Koskenniemi see Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 7 and fn. 2, 73 and fn. 6.
30 I use the masculine, because the critic’s image in this text is a projection of its author, Martti Koskenniemi.
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he is able to detach himself from the world he ﬁnds himself in and able to conduct his
diagnosis in a space that is not occupied by the very objects he wishes to analyze. So, these
veryobjectsdonot constitutehimandhe is able tomaster them.Thecritical theorist,
here, is an individual that can know in ways that a reiﬁed individual cannot; he is
capable of highlighting as contingent that which may have been falsely thought of
as universally necessary. It is the knowledge acquired and given by his interrogative
attitude and distance from his objects that allows him to escape the conditions of
his existence. In Koskenniemi’s ownwords:
The critical argument’s critical potential lies in showing that it is possible to escape
from the frustratingly weak character of legal discourse by extending the range of
permissible argumentative styles beyond the points in which it is usually held that
legal argument must stop in order to remain “legal”.31
[I seek to] provide the possibility for reformed routine; a routine which allows the
lawyer to escape from the limitations of the role and help create a better society while
enabling him to live a conscious and meaningful life as a lawyer in the midst of the
actuality of social and political conﬂict.32
Wehave felt thatextendinguponimaginationwemust renouncethesecuritywhich
our legal roles offered us. Yet, remaining within roles seemed to require unreﬂective
assimilation or engaging in phantasy. We were not relieved from the painful task of
living and choosing in the midst of political conﬂict. Instead of impartial umpires or
spectators, we were cast as players in the game, members in somebody’s team. It is not
that we need to play the game better, or more self-consciously. We need to re-imagine
the game, reconstruct its rules, redistribute the prizes.33
Where the non-critical or reiﬁed lawyer is imprisoned within constraints or struc-
tures, the critical theorist inKoskenniemi’s text is able to promise freedom, through
choice and transformation, from these very constraints. The politics of this form of
critical theory is one of setting the reiﬁed subject free. Within this narrative there
is always something that can be done despite, and beyond, the structured character
of one’s situation.34 And what we see, given this image of the critical subject and its
projection of the critic, is the Sartrean subject.
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness is an account of what it means for a human to be in
theworld. At the book’s centre lies a distinction between things in theworld (being-
in-itself, or roughly, theobject) and thehumanbeing (being-for-itself, consciousness,
cogito, or roughly, the subject). These are distinct parts of the world that comprise
concrete human reality only in a synthetic relationship with each other.35 Whilst
an object is a non-conscious thing that always coincides with itself, the subject is a
consciousness that is conscious of itself and always reaches beyond what it is, all the while
31 Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 542.
32 Ibid., at 553 (emphasis added).
33 Ibid., at 561.
34 For an exploration of the connection between structuralism/ideology critique and emancipatory politics in
American critical legal studies see, J. Boyle, ‘The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social
Thought’, (1986) 133University of Pennsylvania Law Review 685, at 743–5; P. Gabel and D. Kennedy, ‘Roll over
Beethoven’, (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 1, at 53–4.
35 J-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (H. Barnes (tr.), M. Warnock (intr.),
2003), 27.
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continually creating itself.36 Sartre’s task is ‘to penetrate into the profoundmeaning of
the relation “man-world”’.37 This, at ﬁrst blush, seems to be an ontological question
concernedwith the nature and relations of being. On the other hand, Koskenniemi’s
workoffers a historical grounding forhis critical international lawyer. Sartre remains
relevant precisely because his analysis is notmerely ontological; it becomes historical
to theextent thatheargues that it seeks toexist inconcreterealityandisanattitudeof
living in theworld. As a consequence, his historical stance presupposes and imports
the conclusions of his ontological analysis.38
In Sartre’s writings the individual possesses the speciﬁcally human ‘attitude of
interrogation’.39 Tobe able to reﬂectuponandquestiononeself andone’s situation is
at thecoreofbeinghuman.Aquestionofcoursedoesnotguaranteeananswer. Itmay
also furnish ananswer in thenegative.Or itmayeven limit anafﬁrmative answer (‘It
is thus and not otherwise’).40 For Sartre, the constant possibility of these negations
constitutes the heart of what it is to be a human, a subject, or a consciousness. It is
this possibility of negation that conditions every process of questioning, and this
process in turn is thevery conditionof a reﬂective consciousness.41 Negationsdeﬁne
the subject, leading to certain forms of anxiety, frustration and anguish. At the heart
of the critical subject’s being is a kernel of nothingness, for it is this that affords him
such a role. But it is in seeking detachment from the world, transcending its objects,
that this subject ﬁnds the possibility of freedom:
Anguish then is the reﬂective apprehension of freedom by itself. In this sense it is mediation, for
although it is immediate consciousness of itself, it arises from the negation of the appeals of the
world where I had been engaged – in order to apprehend myself as consciousness which
possesses apreontological comprehensionof its essenceandapre-judicative senseof its
possibilities.Anguish isopposedtothemindof theseriousmanwhoapprehendsvalues
in terms of the world and who resides in the reassuring, materialistic substantiation
of values. In the serious mood I deﬁne myself in terms of the object by pushing aside
a priori as impossible all enterprises in which I am not engaged at the moment; the
meaning which my freedom has given to the world, I apprehend as coming from the
world and constituting my obligations. In anguish I apprehend myself at once as totally
free and as not being able to derive the meaning of the world except as coming from myself.42
In this passagewe seewhySartre’smetaphysicmay lie at theheart ofKoskenniemi’s
imageof thecritic(al subject).Therelationshipbetweenthe individualand theworld
operates through splitting them and establishing a hierarchy. In Sartre, the subject
can master the world without the world constituting it (in its reﬂective place) in
36 On the object: ‘Being-in-itself (eˆtre-en-soi): Non-conscious Being. It is the Being of the phenomenon and
overﬂows the knowledgewhichwehave of it. It is a plenitude, and strictly speakingwe can say of it only that
it is.’ Ibid., at 650 and see also, 18–21. On the subject: ‘But it would be necessary to complete the deﬁnition
and formulate it more like this: consciousness is a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this
being implies a being other than itself.’ at 18 (original emphasis).
37 Ibid., at 28.
38 H. Marcuse, ‘Sartre’s Existentialism’, in Studies in Critical Philosophy (J. de Bres (tr.), 1972), 157, 171–7.
39 Sartre, supra note 35, at 28.
40 Ibid., at 29.
41 Ibid., at 29 and see also 53–5.
42 Ibid., at 63 (emphasis added).
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turn.43 Thesubject cangainaspeciﬁcdistance fromhisobjectof analysis.A reﬂective
consciousness (orknowingconsciousness)44 maysuffer frustrationandanguish, but
it is this that secures him space away from the world and its objects. And just as
the critic can transcend international law’s reiﬁed objects and its structure, Sartre’s
subject is able to master and transcend the world.45
Sartre also accepts that an individual always ﬁnds himself in a given circum-
stances, not of his own making. Similarly, Koskenniemi asserts an image of the
international lawyer as a social agent who occupies given social roles, through
which he helps produce the structure of international legal language. But Sartre’s
subject, just as Koskenniemi’s critical international lawyer, is able to also (moment-
arily) transcend the given ‘situation’ that so degrades her possibilities and potential.
This transcendence is achieved because the individual subject alone is able to able to
determine the limits of her situation. It is she that determines themeaning of any given
adversity by choosing to see the situation in light of the goal she chooses.46 In short:
the real limits of a given situation depend on how we exercise our absolute and free choice
to see the situation and its limits.47 A pre-given situation is hence made the subjects
own. Hemasters itsmeaning – its limits and its relevance to her own condition – all
through her act of choice.
This is the imposing logic that sustains the emancipatory politics of critical legal
thought. ForKoskenniemi, ‘[conscious agents]must participate in social routine and
yet, do this from a distance. To be a conscious actor requires relatedness to the social
world in a way which it is possible to live in the present without losing a sense of
the beyond.’48 The social role does not constitute the individual lawyer, but is rather
appropriated by him. The critical subject is able to make the situation his own and
realize his freedom in choosing to transform it. Importantly, notice that this logic
requires a subject that can take a speciﬁc distance from a givenworld – an irreconcil-
able andalwaysmaintained subject / object split. It requires a consciousness that can
transcend the world because it is reﬂective and not entirely shaped by the world’s
belief and social structures.49 It requires the elementals of an empty subject whose
43 ‘The ﬁrst procedure of a philosophy ought to expel things from consciousness and to reestablish its true
connectionwith the world, to know that consciousness is a positional consciousness of the world’, ibid., at 7
(original emphasis).
44 Sartre considers this the only mode by which to become conscious of an object: ‘The self-consciousness we
ought to consider not as a newconsciousness, but as the onlymode of existencewhich is possible for a consciousness
of something.’ Ibid., at 10 (original emphasis).
45 T. Adorno, ‘Subject and Object’ in A. Arato and E. Gebhart, The Essential Frankfurt Reader (1985), 497, 498–9.
46 ‘In particular the coefﬁcient of adversity in things can not be an argument against our freedom, for it is by
us – i.e., by the preliminary positing of an end – that this coefﬁcient of adversity arises. . . . Thus although
brute things (what Heidegger calls “brute existents”) can from the start limit our freedom of action, it is our
freedom itself which must ﬁrst constitute the framework, the technique, and the ends in relation to which
they will manifest themselves as limits.’ Sartre, supra note 35, at 503–4 (original emphasis).
47 ‘The technical and philosophical concept of freedom, the only one which we are considering here, means
only the autonomy of choice. . . . Thus we shall not say that a prisoner is always free to go out of prison,
which would be absurd, nor that he is always free to long for release, which would be an irrelevant truism,
but that he is always free to try to escape (or get himself liberated); that is, that whatever his condition may
be, he can project his escape and learn the value of his project by undertaking some action.’ Ibid., at 505.
48 Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 548 (emphasis added).
49 ‘In occupying and fulﬁlling roles which are open to us we reproduce those imaginative and institutional
constraints through which any particular society establishes its identity. . . . Simultaneously, roles are a
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choices can never be constructed by the world. Sartre, for example, considers that
the constraints society placed on the Jewish population during the 1930s and 40s
only existed in a concrete historical sense, and have meaning, to the extent that a
Jew choses to see them as constraints. A Jewish person can transcend the anti-Semitic
signs (‘No Jews allowed here’) and the anti-Semitic structures, if he chooses to view
these as purely external objects that do not constitute him, his freedom to choose,
or his beliefs and consciousness.50
It seems reasonable to argue that this existential notion of freedom, if it asked to
live in concrete reality, borders on absurdity.51 Sartre’s philosophy, and to the extent
it undergirds Koskenniemi’s text, delivers the subject into a tyrannical idealism.
The critic premised on a Sartrean metaphysic bears a constant and unrelenting
responsibility for the world and for himself.52 Everything rests on his absolutely free
choices; the burden of the world is his to master.
But even as the critic has exposed theobjectifying structureswithin international
legal thought, and the critical subject realizes her ‘true’ situation, their freedom is
onlymomentary. Or, in thewords ofKoskenniemi, there is ‘little support for the belief
that revolution or happiness could survive the ﬁrst moments of enthusiastic bliss.
Themorning after is cold, and certain to come’.53 This is both a historical lesson and
one that emerges from Sartre’s analysis. His subject can never fully coincide with
the world (for then it would be an object) and it can never coincide with its actual
situation. Justasthecriticcreatesanewworld,andthecriticalsubject is remadeinthe
critic’s image, theycannotcoincidewiththeworldtheircritique,orrealizations,have
produced. The critic(al subject)must, at every newhistorical juncture, renounce the
knowledge and subject that critique has produced. And because there is no human
existence without the ‘situation’, or no ‘non-human situation’, the responsibility to
realize my freedom occurs in making the situation mine – to constantly make a
choice on the same andnewground ‘again and againwithout a break’.54 Critique for
this subject, like existence, knowsnoboundsof timeexceptmortal death. The image
of the critic(al subject) that emerges from Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia is
an individual who lives an essentially unhappy and constantly burdened existence,
who can always (and is so burdened to) realize his absolutely free choice, all the
whilst knowing that any freedom achieved can only ever be ﬂeeting. And must be
fought for over and over, each time anew, till one is no longer capable.
constant threat to consciousness to identity. There is this dilemma: to participate in routine, one needs to do
this through a role. But the more one immerses oneself in one’s role, the less one is actually participating
as a conscious agent at all. . . . For the international lawyer, social existence means participation in legal routine
and yet doing this so as not to be wholly submerged in it.’ Ibid., at 549–50 (emphasis added). You will notice that
the subject remains in control of the constraints, but is never constituted by them; constraints are rather
produced by and upon the individual.
50 Sartre, supra note 35, at 545–8.
51 See generally Marcuse, supra note 38.
52 Sartre, supra note 35, at 574–7.
53 M.Koskenniemi, ‘BetweenCommitmentandCynicism:Outline foraTheoryof InternationalLawasPractice’,
in The Politics of International Law (2011) 271, 293.
54 Sartre, supra note 35, at 574–5.
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2.3. Tensions and Limits
I have tried to make explicit the implicit. I have argued that we see the Sartrean
subject at the heart of From Apology to Utopia. The subject, her attitudes and char-
acteristics, her worldview may now be better understood. She ought, at the least,
to be graspable. This is a subject that splits herself from and transcends the world
(her object), possesses a reﬂective and constantly transcendent image of rational
consciousness, and who believes that concrete freedom lies in absolute choice. In
this ﬁnal substantive section the question becomes whether this subject is capable
of realizing the politics of the critical international legal thought.
In the subsections that follow, I will show how the critic(al subject) is structured
by certain antinomies and sustained by certain myths. The ﬁrst contradiction that
constitutes this subject is the search for a politics of community, whilst simultan-
eously trying to dominate a part of the polity (Section 2.3.1). The second is between
competing and opposite understandings of freedom (Section 2.3.2). Third and ﬁ-
nally, I argue that the image of the subject that we see in FromApology to Utopiamay,
ironically, perpetuate and reproduce the very ideology of liberalism that it seeks to
challenge (Section 2.3.3).
2.3.1. Between Community and Domination
The ﬁrst tension arises as From Apology to Utopia’s critique moves from its negative
to its positivemoment; or, fromundoing false consciousness through structuralism,
towards intersubjectivity (Section 2.1). Koskenniemi’s is a critique with the ideal
of community. I argue that the performed ideology critique sits in irresolvable
tension with the idealized move towards community, for the simple reason that
Koskenniemi’s ideology critique effects, at a subjective level, a commitment to
annihilate its opponent.
To understand the nature of this ‘annihilation’, it must ﬁrst be understood that
the critic (and then the critical subject that the critic’s critique engenders) abhors the
situationwhere an individual is alienated fromhis freedom.Rather, to ‘have identity
asconsciousagents theymustﬁghtconstantlyagainstalienationandassimilation’.55
Koskenniemi sees the ﬁeld of international law populated by those lawyers whose
‘identity [lies] in his skill as a managing technician of [an] invisible international
“system”’.56 The formof critique thatwe see in FromApology toUtopia functions upon
and for such individuals. It is critique built on a war of consciousness.57 The task
is to do away with a consciousness that does not realize itself and its potential as
consciousness. It is to do away with the individual who views herself as a ‘thing’
that is subordinated to the standardized techniques of a given social system (i.e.,
as a managing technician in a system of laws). This individual cannot realize the
potential of herself as a consciousness, precisely because she considers herself to
fully coincide with her situation. This type of individual can only ever be an object
55 Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 548.
56 Ibid., at 554.
57 See generally P. Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (M. Eldred (tr.), 1988) (on critique as a form of a war on
consciousness).
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 29 Jul 2016 IP address: 188.238.105.188
IMAGES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 711
in a Sartrean metaphysic, for she does not realize that she is always more than
the possibilities of her given situation. She possesses a form of consciousness that
alienates her from her freedom, her choices and her responsibilities.
Critique seeks to ‘annihilate’ this form of subjectivity or consciousness. It wishes
to demonstrate its falsity, and replace it with its own ‘truth’.58 Ideology critique, in
the particular sense we see in From Apology to Utopia, must begin with the undoing
of a speciﬁc form of consciousness. It does this through an act of domination: the
(claimed) exercise of a superior form of reason. The critic and the critical subject
does what she does with all objects; she harnesses a speciﬁc distance from them and
then masters them.59 And this act of domination precedes the act of annihilation:
the consciousness that does not realize itself cannot be an acceptable part of the
polity where ideology critique has done its work.
Wemay nowperhaps see how a kernel of irony lies at the heart of Koskenniemi’s
critique. Thewill to lessendomination is premiseduponanact of domination. In the
positivemomentofhis text, even if inter-subjective conﬂict remains in theworld,we
‘can slowly proceed towards . . . decreasing domination and increasing the sense of
authentic community betweendisagreeing social agents’.60 The ideal of community
presupposes an understanding of the political. It is not premised on the erasure of
conﬂict, or the move to consensus. It does not deny dissensus, but rather provides
a hermeneutic footing for disagreement. But this notion of community does not
presuppose exclusion, or the undoing of a part of the polity. Critique, in its idealized
image, has enabled this open, conversant andconﬂictual community. Yet in this very
act of constitution lies a founding act of annihilation. One part of the community
is afﬂicted with falsity of thought andmust be replaced by a ‘truer’ form of thought.
False consciousness must be undone in this war of consciousness. The subjectivity
of a speciﬁc individual must be undone and replaced with another subjectivity that
will bring her in closer relation to the group in which the critic resides. And so at
the heart of an idealized community where dominance is constantly lessened, is an
act of domination par excellence.
Matters do not end here. This act of domination may be constantly re-inscribed
into the fabric of the international legal community. Can the critic we have seen
emerge surrender this initial act of dominance? The Sartrean metaphysic almost
ensures that the war of consciousness is relentless; a Sartrean subject can never let
her consciousness coincide with itself without lapsing into an object that needs
to be mastered. And just as a certain falsity is replaced by a ‘truth’, this ‘truth’ is
58 I bracket any questions of the viability of this form of critique, but false consciousness critique has had a
numberofdetractors. SeeM.Heidegger,What isCalledThinking (F.WieckandS.Gray (tr.), 1968), 34; Sloterdijk,
supra note 57, at 3–137; M. Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, in C. Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews
and Other Writings 1972-1977 (1980), 78. Koskenniemi has brieﬂy intimated as the possible ‘naivety’ of his
criticalmethod, butwhether this is his position, or of his critics is unclear. SeeM. Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics
of International Law – 20 Years Later’, (2009) 20 EJIL 7, at 8.
59 This is also a natural consequence of Sartre’s metaphysic and rationalism. Speciﬁcally it is the consequence
of the deﬁnitions of the object and subject, the subject-object hierarchy and, in particular, the rule of the
Master-Slave dialectic in the relationship between self and Other – which is a thoroughgoing of Sartre’s
philosophy. On the relationship between ego and Other, see Sartre, supra note 35, at 383–452.
60 Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 547.
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shown to be its own form of falsity. The anxious responsibility attached to always
having to transcend a given way of being is the recurring narrative at the heart of
both the Sartrean metaphysic and the nature of false consciousness critique.61 And
so, the critic, and the critical subject that follows him, will nearly always be torn
between the antinomy that lies at the heart of the negative and positive moments
of his critique. The image we see in From Apology to Utopia is that of a critic who
aspires to less domination as his ideal, all the while constantly perpetuating a form
of domination himself.
2.3.2. Emancipatory Politics between Freedoms
The critic(al subject)’s identity and Koskenniemi’s text is structured by a second
antinomy. Two incompatible notions of freedom are produced by the text: (a) free-
dom from a situation, and (b) freedom through a situation. On the one hand, the
Sartrean subject delivers us into the ﬁrst understanding by positing a subject who
can constantly appropriate and transcend her situation. This is the text’s presup-
posed subject. But on the other hand, Koskenniemi’s structuralism delivers us into
the second. A position reinforced by the text’s normative subject (i.e., the idealized
socialized subject we see at the end of From Apology to Utopia). But let me elaborate
on this antinomy.
The empty subject that we saw emerge from Sartre is one who believes that
freedom is always possible. This is the freedom of choice and it is absolute. The
subject’s ontological freedom conditions and obtains her practical freedom.62 The
critic, building on this Sartrean metaphysic, requires a space for reﬂection that is
not occupied by the objects of his analysis (beliefs, structures, discourses etc.). And
the critical subject is endowed with this same ‘space’. By freezing the subject-object
dichotomy, critique can maintain an image of this ‘space’ or momentary distance
from externalities. Not only is this necessary for the critic’s and critical subject’s
performance, but it is foundational to her promises. The fantasy she sells his reader
depends upon the latter being able to ﬁnally occupy this same space or distance
from the world (once his false consciousness is undone). But both the performance
and the promise deliver us into identical ideas of freedom. Critique in From Apology
to Utopia’s casts freedom as the absence of constraint, as freedom from a situation.
And yet, Koskenniemi’s structuralism and his normative, socialized, subject ad-
vocates for a different understanding of freedom. ‘True, the lawyer is constrained.
But inasmuch as he experiences the conﬂicting pull of the criticisms of apology
and utopia, he is not fully so.’63 Koskenniemi’s structuralism enables the lawyer
61 For a recollection on the relentless pattern of the Sartreanmetaphysic, see above Section 2.2.
62 There is an argument that we see two ideas of freedom in Sartre: ontological freedom and what he calls
‘freedom of obtaining’. The ﬁrst conditions the second, and the second presupposes the functioning of the
ﬁrst. At the heart of my analysis is the understanding that Sartre collapses his ontological inquiry into
the realm of the real, i.e., the concrete, historical context. Some authors may reasonably disagree with
this. Marcuse and Merleau-Ponty supported my reading, but Simone de Beauvoir famously defended Sartre
against these readings. See Sartre, supra note 35, at 483–4 (on ‘freedom of obtaining’); Marcuse, supra note
38; J. Stewart (ed.), The Debate Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty (1998); S. de Beauvoir, ‘Merleau-Ponty and
Pseudo-Sartreanism’, (1989) 21 International Studies in Philosophy 3.
63 Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 549.
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to see the play of language he can enact so as to be professionally competent. It
is anti-humanist to the extent that it reminds us that social structures exist and
often proceed without any regard for the individual and always through her. But
it also seeks to rescue a form of humanism as it leads the lawyer away from the
stark rationalism that required the Sartrean subject to think of freedom as the
absence of constraint. The logic enabled by Koskenniemi’s normative text is that
constraints, whether linguistic structures, social roles, beliefs or other conditioning
circumstances,provide theenablingconditionsofpossibility.64 Freedombecomesdepend-
ent on constraint. And constraint becomes the very means by which we can enter
into a given world and can realize our concrete possibilities.65 Maurice Merleau-
Ponty put it so: that ‘I am a psychological and historical structure does not limit my
access to theworld, buton thecontrary ismymeansof entering intocommunication
with it’.66 Freedom is achieved through one’s situation.
The result is a text structured by, and oscillating between, certain antinomies.
Not only do we have competing and incompatible understandings of freedom but
we also have incompatible understandings of the subject. On the one hand there is
the image of the individual who is always able to transcend his situation, and on
the other hand, one who seeks to transform his given situation by working within
and opening up its concrete possibilities. The ﬁrst presupposes a bare or empty
consciousness that can alwaysmaster his situation and the second understands the
subject as always constituted, who acts in the world through this constitution. One
is presupposed by the text, the other demanded by it. Each produced in its ownway.
Theseantinomiesarenot idle intellectualmusings.Rather, theygototheverycore
of critical international legal thought for no other project is so driven by the politics
of emancipation. The stakes are considerable. How do the critic and critical subject
speak? From a disembodied, unsituated position within a momentarily separated
space, or from an embodied, historical situated and produced spaces? Not only does
this antinomy go to the heart of the individual’s sense of self and his capacity in the
world, but it also goes to the heart of how we may seek to address the problems of
this world. Andwe ﬁnd it recursively being played out in critical international legal
thought.67 To say little of what is ultimately at stake: whether we may unwittingly
exacerbate the hostile conditions which constitute us, or whether we are capable of
understanding theminanew light andpossiblybringing small amountsofwelcome
relief.
64 See note 31 and accompanying text for a better understanding of how this may play out. Koskenniemi’s
structuralism does not seek to efface the subject.
65 This, in part, is why it has been so easy for people like Stanley Fish to deconstruct the very form of critique
we see in Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia (although he applied it to American critical legal studies).
See S. Fish,DoingWhat Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies
(1989), 457–67. But Maurice Merleau-Ponty believed that this type of philosophy, and Fish’s critique, both
fell into what he called the ‘rationalist’s dilemma: either the free act is possible, or it is not – either the event
originates inme or is imposed onme from the outside.’ M.Merleau-Ponty, Signs (R.McCleary (tr.), 1964), 227.
66 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (C. Smith (tr.), 1962), 455.
67 See for example that which is implied colonial and postcolonial projects within ThirdWorld Approaches to
International Law and in S. Marks, ‘False Contingency’, (2009) 62 Current Legal Problems 1.
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2.3.3. The ‘Stunningly Liberal Subject’ 68
The philosopher Jacques Rancie`re once stated that ‘revolutionaries invented a
“people” before inventing its future’.69 This is to say that not only does all polit-
ics require a subject but also the framing of the future happens in the moment of
political intervention. The critic(al subject) is notmerely the conditionofpossibility
ofKoskenniemi’s text. Rather, her image frames the potential of his intervention, for
the realization of his politics. It is not enough, however, that this subject is capable
of realizing the politics of Koskenniemi’s critical thought. More importantly, we
must be seduced andmanipulated into believing that this subject has this capacity.
Readers, consumers, students and co-conspirators of Koskenniemi’s textmust come
tobelieve that theconceptionof the self they see inhiswork is anaccurateaccountof
the nature of their being.70 But what if the critical subject is not capable of realizing
the politics of critical thought and we as readers realize that we have been seduced
by particular myths?
If you accept the argument made in Section 2.2 above, the absolute free and
empty subject is presupposed by Koskenniemi’s critique. Sartre is the dirty little
secret at the heart of From Apology to Utopia. This critical subject, no matter her
conditions or situation, she is able to determine, appropriate and master it. She is
always responsible for her own freedom, and indeed, freedom can only appear as a
result of exercised responsibility. This freedom from constraint comes into sight as
she empties herself, as she separates from and transcends her object. The problem
of course is that we already live within such a cultural narrative of ourselves. It is
strikingly familiarpreciselybecause it is thenarrativeofpolitical liberalism.Andthe
image of the critical subject is, as Pierre Schlag notes in another context, that of the
‘stunningly liberal subject’.71 Liberalism has established, sustained and rejuvenated
itself by constantly furnishing us with an image of the individual who is always
self-determining and always capable of making any choice she wishes to. Not only
is freedom equated with choice, but this choice is an ever-present possibility and
always absolute. The liberal subject is seduced (and often ironically, shamed) into
believing that she is the alpha and omega in her relations with the world.
So at the precise historical juncture that Koskenniemi’s text seeks to challenge
the main tenets of liberalism,72 his text offers a subject who sees herself and her
emancipation on the same foundations as that of the liberal subject. The Sartrean
kernel at the core of From Apology to Utopia is no longer innocent or dormant. One
is left to question the extent to which Koskenniemi’s critique is capable of realizing
its politics of liberating the individual. But perhapsmore damningly, Koskenniemi’s
critique and its view of the subject may perpetuate the very ideology of its, of our, time.
The point is not merely that the critical subject is promised freedom through the
68 Schlag, supra note 9, at 1697.
69 J. Rancie`re, ‘The Thinking of Dissensus: Politics and Aesthetics’, in P. Bowman and R. Stamp (eds.), Reading
Rancie`re (2011), 1, 13.
70 F. Michelman, ‘The Subject of Liberalism’, (1994) 46 Stanford Law Review 1807, at 1831 (making the point in
regards the liberal subject).
71 Schlag, supra note 9, at 1697.
72 See generally Koskenniemi, supra note 2, at 71–157.
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operation of critical thought. It is that the grounds of this freedom are precisely the
same as those embedded within the liberal subject. With this realization comes
another: freedom, and its constant promise, is a mode and method through which
we are managed. Sartre was all too aware of this. In 1946 he remarked:
The revolutionary . . . distrusts freedom. And rightly so. There has never been a lack
of prophets to proclaim to him that he was free, and each time in order to cheat him.73
Koskenniemi, many years after he wrote From Apology to Utopia, would state much
the same: ‘freedom is also a way to govern human beings’.74 The irony should be
quite apparent; the critical thought that sought to empower, liberate and enable the
individual may then very well have delivered her into the very tyranny she sought
to escape. And in doing so, helped sustain the very political ideology that she and
her politics sought to challenge.
But the stories, images and problems of the international lawyer and her identity
are only just beginning.
3. THE PRAGMATIC PROFESSIONAL
Therewas always somethingmissing fromKoskenniemi’s formal structuralism.We
were never privy to how international law changed or transformed; it did not do so
of its own volition. From this perspective it was natural that the individual interna-
tional legal professional would move to the forefront of Koskenniemi’s subsequent
writings. And so, The Gentle Civilizer is a natural supplement to From Apology to
Utopia.
In the pages that follow, I look at the various angles from which Koskenniemi
approaches his now more visible subject. I approach identity through a form of
border politics. The imagewe see of the international lawyer is asmuch constituted
by the substance of Koskenniemi’s text as by that which it opposes and that which
constantly laps onto its boundaries. First, the historical imagination that undergirds
The Gentle Civilizer is understood against the contemporary predominance of disen-
chantment (Section 3.2). I then look at how Koskenniemi’s ‘culture of formalism’
sets itself against managerialism, which allows for a view that the image of the
international lawyer is intimately linked to a speciﬁc practice and the freedom this
mayenable (Section3.3). Finally, I outlinehowcertain tensions emerge in this image
of the pragmatic professional before gently inquiring whether the refuge of ethics
is sufﬁcient (Section 3.4).
3.1. The Gentle Civilizer: Non-Theory
Koskenniemi’s ﬁrst monograph displayed a theoretical and methodological clarity
that his second eschewed. Such was the formality of his method in From Apology to
Utopia that it constrainedwhat could be reasonably or thoroughly argued. However
73 J-P. Sartre, ‘Mate´rialisme et Re´volution’ (1946), 1 Les Temps Modernes 9, at 14.
74 M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law Between Fragmentation and Constitutionalism’ Speech, 18 May 2003
(Recife, Brazil), 15 (para. 31).
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in The Gentle Civilizer, ‘the constraints of any rigorous “method” have been set
aside in an effort to create intuitively plausible and politically engaged narratives
about the emergence and gradual transformation of a profession that plays with
the readers empathy’.75 Koskenniemi joined many others in the New Approaches
to International Law tradition in his move away from the stringent application
of theory and method. Perhaps in these quarters such notions were considered as
mere ‘disciplinary ﬁxtures and academic reiﬁcations’.76 In any case, there can be
little doubt that he is sceptical of theory’s potential alone.77 Or, perhaps we could
ascribe his lack of transparency regarding theory and method to be an essential
part of his theoretical posture. The Gentle Civilizer was a sustained effort to move
beyond ‘critical reason’78 and its rationalizing tendencies, towards the sensuous.
This ought to be regarded as a key theoretical move (more on this in Section 3.2)
for the sensuous often ﬁnds itself in retreat or cast aside when confronted with the
coldness of method’s reason.
In any case, the lack of overt method does not mean that Koskenniemi’s text
is not propelled and structured by speciﬁc theoretical commitments. It merely
means that it is not reducible to them and that they have to be teased out. The
Gentle Civilizer is driven by hard-to-grasp terms, such as ‘narrative’, ‘sensibility’ and
‘imagination’.79 They arrive in Koskenniemi’s text with complex and contentious
histories and emerge fromhis pages with a (purposeful) lack of clarity. For example,
is his appreciation of ‘history as narrative’80 inﬂuenced by his wish to encourage
empathy?81 Beyond the extent to which this particular move may encourage a
heterodox approach to critique, some terms (such as ‘narrative’) are of little interest
to me. Others, such as ‘sensibility’ and ‘imagination’ or even ‘culture of formalism’,
are far more central to Koskenniemi’s text and his emancipatory politics. Over the
next few pages, I hope their meaning and use may become clearer.
3.2. TheHistorical Imagination in Times of Disenchantment
If there is a driving force, or politics, behind Koskenniemi’s secondmonograph and
a number of his subsequent writings, it is an embodied critique of the rationalizing
and technocratic tendencies inmodern international law. In riposte, he seeks eman-
cipatory refuge in the potential of a historical conditioned ‘imagination’ and what
he came to term a ‘culture of formalism’.
75 Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 10.
76 O. Korhonen, ‘Innovative International Law Approaches and the European Condition’, in J. Beneyto and D.
Kennedy,New Approaches to International Law: The European and American Experiences (2012), 193, 206.
77 Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 504; Koskenniemi, supra note 14.
78 Koskenniemi, supra note 58, at 16.
79 Frustration at the lack of methodological clarity has been noted elsewhere, see G. Galindo, ‘Martti Kosken-
niemi and the Historiographical Turn in International Law’, (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law
539, at 546.
80 Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 8.
81 See R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (1989), xvi; see also R. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn (2010),
207–13. For Koskenniemi’s appreciation of narrative as opening a discourse in much the same way as
heterodox traditions, see M. Koskenniemi, ‘Histories of International Law: Dealing with Eurocentrism’,
(2011) 19 Rechtsgeschichte 152, at 179.
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MaxWeber famously stated that the ‘fate of our times is characterized by ration-
alization and intellectualization, and above all, by the disenchantment of theworld.
Precisely the ultimate andmost sublime values have retreated frompublic life . . . ’82
It is within this tradition of thought – against the conditions of disenchantment
– that Koskenniemi’s The Gentle Civilizer emerges. His writing seeks to confront
what he terms ‘managerialism’.83 This is the process by which politics and political
struggle is shortcut and sidelined by technical expertise. A phenomenon exacer-
bated by the fragmentation of our world and international law. In our disenchanted
world, empirical and technical knowledges are preferred even as they ‘obscure the
way power works and make particular intellectual or social hierarchies appear as
natural aspects of our lives’.84 Managerialism introduces the image of the interna-
tional lawyer as a ‘fully instrumentalised cog’85 whose ‘fantasy . . . is that of holding
the prince’s ear’,86 of becoming ‘counsel for the functional power holder’.87
Koskenniemi’s response is a turn to history and an embodied critique. As it
emerges in The Gentle Civilizer, critique is no longer a matter of proper distance or
reﬂexive reason. Long gone are references to ‘critical reason’, the ‘critical conscious-
ness’ or even reﬂexivity. In its place arrives an intimate and embodied exercise. A
careful, detailed andperhapsnostalgic recollectionof apast that is able to impart im-
portant lessons about the endeavour of practicing international law. Peter Sloterdijk
outlined this form of critique:
It is not on the basis of elevated, distanced critique that achieves grand overviews but
a stance of extreme closeness –micrology. If things have become too close for comfort
for us, a critique must arise that expresses this discomfort. It is not a matter of proper
distancebut of properproximity. . . . Because the sovereigntyofminds (Kopfe) is always
false, the new critique prepares to slip frommind into the whole body.88
This is the driving thrust of Koskenniemi’s second monograph. It proposes to see
international law as a ‘terrain of fear and ambition, fantasy and desire, conﬂict
and utopia, and a host of other aspects of the phenomenological lives of its prac-
titioners’.89 Koskenniemi sought to place the work of ‘men of 1873’ ‘within social
and political contexts’ such as ‘the professional and political projects they tried to
advance through their practice, on the struggles for power and position in which
they were engaged, and on their defeats and victories’, as well as the minutiae of
their life.90 It is the very intimacy of this critique that allows Koskenniemi to bring
82 M.Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation’, in H. Gerth and C. Mills (eds.), FromMaxWeber: Essays in Sociology (1946),
129, at 155.
83 For a general discussion see S. Singh, ‘The Potential of International Law: Fragmentation and Ethics’, (2011)
24 LJIL 23; andA. Lang and S.Marks, ‘Peoplewith Projects:Writing the Lives of International Lawyers’, (2013)
27 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 437.
84 Koskenniemi, supra note 58, at 16.
85 M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’, (2007) 70Modern
Law Review 1, at 26.
86 Koskenniemi, supra note 58, at 15.
87 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Miserable Comforters: International Relations as a New Natural Law’, (2009) 15 European
Journal of International Relations 395, at 411.
88 Sloterdijk, supra note 57, at xxxiii.
89 Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 7.
90 Ibid., at 2 and 5–6.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 29 Jul 2016 IP address: 188.238.105.188
718 SAHIB SINGH
the international lawyer face to face, in part, with those historical practices, atti-
tudes, habits and ‘emotional dispositions’91 that have becomepart of the discipline’s
background. This goes to the heart of Koskenniemi’s notion of ‘sensibility’.92 The
individual international lawyer is shaped and constituted by this ‘background’ and
more importantly it is his means of entering into the world of international law as
a shared enterprise. It is themeans throughwhich hemay act and, in turn, constitute
his shared world.
Koskenniemi offers this critique so that he may challenge managerialism by
capturing our imagination, so we may aspire to a world other than the one we see.
Imagination is deployed as a graceful counterpoint tomanagerialism’s instrumental
reason and technicalization. It pushes the ungraspable onto the very form of reason
that reduces everything just so that it may be grasped and utilized. Indeed, imagin-
ation is the mode through which his historicism and critique seeks to function, or
realize itself in theworld. InKoskenniemi’s words, ‘the historical narrative liberates
the political imagination tomovemore freely in the world of alternative choices’.93
In The Gentle Civilizer he put it so:
I hope that these essays provide a historical contrast to the state of the discipline
today by highlighting the ways in which international lawyers in the past forty years
have failed to use the imaginative opportunities that were available to them, and open
horizons beyond academic and political instrumentalization, in favor of worn-out
internationalist causes that form themainstay of today’s commitment to international
law. . . . Return to “gentle civilizing” as a professional self-deﬁnition is certainly no
longer plausible. But this is not to say that international lawyers could not learn
from their fathers and grandfathers in the profession. Understanding the way they
argued in particular situations, often in great crises and sometimes heavily involved
as participants or even victims, provides a sense of the possibilities that could exists
today. The limits of our imagination are a product of a history that might have gone
another way. There is nothing permanently ﬁxed in those limits. They are produced by
a particular conﬁguration of commitments and projects by individual, well-situated
lawyers.94
For Koskenniemi, imagination and its possibilities are simultaneously understood
as a product of the discipline’s tradition and its collective history, aswell as a remedy
for our current disenchanted condition. But this is not anoverburdened expectation.
He does not expect our imagination tomaster the world for us, or to be the constant
space of reprieve that can introduce radically new modes of future possibilities. In
this respect, his visiondiffers substantially fromthe legacyofAmerican critical legal
thought;where imagination isoftencraftedas a repositoryof endless transformative
possibilities and the shelter for an unrestrained freedom.95 Within this important
91 Ibid., at 2.
92 Ibid.
93 Koskenniemi, supra note 58, at 18.
94 Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 5 (original emphasis).
95 See, for example, Boyle, supra note 34, at 742; R. Gordon, ‘New Developments in Legal Theory’, in D. Kairys
(ed.),The Politics of Law:AProgressiveCritique (1990), 413, 422; R.Unger, ‘TheCritical Legal StudiesMovement’,
(1983) 96Harvard Law Review 561, at 584.
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passage, imagination and its possibilities are intimately tied to, and constituted by,
a communal world and its shared history.
Freedom and responsibility to change our world comes if we are able to appre-
ciate, with care, the marginal historical practices that comprise our disciplinary
‘background’. ThiswasHeidegger’s legacy.96 Of courseKoskenniemi, likeHeidegger,
knows that we cannot fully grasp these assumptions and the habits into which
we are thrown.97 Rather, a delicate appreciation of the discipline’s heritage and the
practices that comprise it, may allow us to ﬁnd ways to contribute to changing our
shared world in its current situation. For Koskenniemi this meant learning from
how the ‘men of 1873’ had exercised their imaginations. It meant making oneself
attuned to how thesemen had sustained an ‘enlightened responsibility’;98 ‘personal
virtue and responsibility’;99 a ‘moral consciousness, cultivated by a humanitarian
sensibility’;100 a ‘moralityof attitude–of seriousness . . . of tolerance, andofpersonal
and professional virtue’;101 and a ‘moral sensibility’.102 Koskenniemi’s message to
the international lawyer may be that we can ground our concrete existence today
in the lessons we learn from the past. Not by professing, or aspiring to, the same
identity – for it is one that is no longer plausible – but by allowing ourselves to be
struck by these historically rooted practices of moral responsibility, so that wemay
aspire to and imagine other possibilities. For Koskenniemi, it is this that lies at the
heart of our capacity to resist our disenchanted conditions.
In Koskenniemi, just as in Heidegger, the ﬁrst respite from technicalization lies
in the potential of an embodied imagination.103 Implied we see an image of the
international lawyer that is the product, and simultaneously the maker, of partic-
ular disciplinary practices, assumptions and predispositions. The empty Sartrean
subject, rooted in Cartesian philosophy,104 which we saw at the heart of the crit-
ical lawyer in From Apology to Utopia, has been removed. This image elevated the
absolutely autonomous agent who sought and was capable of achieving freedom
from constraints, precisely because these could be grasped and absorbed by a re-
ﬂective consciousness. In The Gentle Civilizer, we begin to see a subject who enters
into relations with the world only through the practices and structures that help
shape his body and not merely her mind. Her notion of freedom is deﬁned by her
(always limited) capacity to engage these structures and transform them only with
sensitivity to past practices. This is a subject who, through an embodied idea of
imagination, is reconnected with his humanity. As Simon Critchley put it: ‘we have
96 ‘The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical possibilities of authentic
existing, anddiscloses them in terms of the heritagewhich that resoluteness, as thrown takes over.’M.Heidegger,
Being and Time (J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (tr.), 1962), 435 (original emphasis).
97 ‘Dasein cannot get behind throwness’, ibid., at 330.
98 Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 406.
99 Ibid., at 80.
100 Ibid., at 53.
101 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Lauterpacht: The Victorian Tradition in International Law’, (1997) 8 European Journal of
International Law 215, at 261.
102 Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 72.
103 See M. Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ in The Question Concerning Technology and other
Essays (1977).
104 See K.Whiteside,Merleau-Ponty and the Foundation of Existential Politics (1988), 71.
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to expect less from [a transcendental] imagination and accustom ourselves to more
minimal transﬁgurations of reality.’105
3.3. Domesticated Critique and the ‘Culture of Formalism’ as a Practice of
Freedom
Koskenniemi then offers a second line of defence against managerialism and the
conditions of disenchantment: a ‘culture of formalism’.106 Amove he complements
in his subsequent critical readings of Kant. In these texts Koskenniemi seeks to
merge the international lawyer’s professional rolewith a critique that could operate
in the role’s context. Peter Sloterdijk gently termed this ‘pseudocritique’ – ‘a period
. . . in which critical stances are subordinated to professional roles’.107 Within Ko-
skenniemi’s ‘pseudo-critique’ we have already seen how speciﬁc tensions emerge
between the competing mentalities, which in turn pull the critical international
lawyer in different, and at times conﬂictual, directions (Section 2.3 above).108
In FromApology to Utopia, the presupposed image of the international lawyer (the
critic(al subject)) was that of a relatively stable subject, despite persistent tensions
and the lived anxieties of the world. This stability came from being the ground
of one’s own freedom (the Sartrean subject), or from the comfort that comes from
disciplinary structures and roles – precisely the conditions thatwe live in aswe seek
to transform them. The logic of the argument seemed to function in two moves.
Critique enters seeking to destabilize the subject – ensuring that it renounces any
rigid claims to a ground or to identity, whilst asking us to embrace the anxieties
and conﬂicts of the world; and professionalism, with its appeals to community,
traditions, structures and roles, arrests this move before it can get too far off the
ground.
The Gentle Civilizer then emerges with a pure focus on those jurists who did
not remain ‘in the scholar’s chamber but were to contribute to social progress’.109
These were men who stressed ‘the pragmatic functions of their professions’,110 and
whose personal virtuewas central to their professional identity. ‘If the law lay in the
conscience of enlightened jurists, was it not precisely the quality of that conscience-
consciousness – virtuous or based – that would be central to law?’111
The underlying message of The Gentle Civilizer – the emancipatory potential of
practice – was in fact enunciated a decade before the monograph was published:
It is what we do – how we act – as practicing lawyers, and not how we theorise about
what we do, that establishes – for the moment – that relation [of attention between
105 S. Critchley,Very little . . . almost nothing: Death, philosophy, literature (2nd edn., 2004), 236.
106 Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 494–509.
107 Sloterdijk, supra note 57, at xxxvi.
108 This is perhaps unsurprising given that some critical international lawyers have argued that they do not
deem it viable to both practice, or offer substantive arguments, and remain loyal to critique. See M. Craven,
G. Simpson, et al., ‘We are teachers of International Law’, (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of International Law 363.
109 Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 57–8.
110 Ibid., at 516.
111 Ibid., at 76–7 (original emphasis).
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constraint and freedom, or between determinism and indeterminism] and determines
who we are.112
After all the identity of international law lies in its ‘its craft-likeness, its being above
all a practice’.113 Koskenniemi emphasized that we must grasp ‘the eclectic and
pragmatic character of legal praxis’.114 It is against this background – of foreground-
ing practice, a moral sensibility and a professional pragmatism – that the culture
of formalism emerged. In complete contrast to the sensuality of imagination and
history, the culture of formalism seeks to tackle managerialism and instrumental
reason in the concrete realm of the political; it is ‘the only available surface over
whichmanagerial governance can be challenged.’115
Koskenniemi wishes to sustain the possibility of an open, inclusive, politics –
and hence, of freedom – in a postmodern age. Borrowing from the work of Ernesto
Laclau he argues for a speciﬁc approach to the (legal) decision(s), for these not only
constitute and reproduce the discipline but more importantly, remain the only
true terrain of the political.116 What Koskenniemi is getting at – at an abstract,
ahistorical level – is a ‘practice of decision-making that persists in time and through
which the aspirations of self-determining communities remain alive’.117 It is upon
a general theory of politics and ‘the decision’, then, that not only his historical
argument for a culture of formalism emerges,118 but also his image of the subject is
constituted.
Themomentofdecision, forKoskenniemiandLaclau, isneverdetermined. It takes
place amongst indeterminacy – or, for Laclau, in a ﬁeld of ‘undecidability’.119 Even if
the extent of this indeterminacymay be in question (whether any choice is open to
the individual, or whether this choice is constrained by, say, a structure, or whether
such a structure always underdetermines the choices open to an individual),120
a decision is always a self-grounding and free moment. It is also a moment that
represses possible alternatives that cannot be enunciated or carried out.121 The
decision is itself deﬁned by this exclusion – it becomes part of what it is. Finally, a
decision is also deﬁned by an internal split between the particularity of its claimand
112 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Theory: Implications for the Practitioner’, in P. Allott (ed.), Theory and International Law
(1991), 1, 45. See also Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 516.
113 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Law, Teleology and International Relations: An Essay in Counterdisciplinarity’, (2012) 26
International Relations 3, at 19.
114 Ibid., at 19.
115 Koskenniemi, supra note 85, at 30.
116 E. Laclau, ‘Deconstruction, pragmatism, hegemony’, in C.Mouffe (ed.),Deconstruction and Pragmatism (1996),
47, 53.
117 Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 508 (emphasis added).
118 Ibid., at 507.
119 E. Laclau, Emancipations (1996), 92.
120 Here we see the difference between deconstructionists, structuralists and positivists (Hart, Kelsen). Each –
irrespective of the level of indeterminacy for which they argue – would not deny the non-grounded nature
of a decision. At a different level of analysis, it would be suspect to conclude the Koskenniemi expands his
indeterminacy thesis, from a certain structuralism, to the deconstruction of Ernesto Laclau; even if he does
rely on the latter’s theory of the decision. But Koskenniemiwould no doubt agree with Laclauwhen he says:
‘what counts as a valid decision will have the limits of a structure which, in its actuality, is only partially
destructured. Themadness of the decision is, if youwant, as all madness, a regulated one.’ Laclau, supra note
116, at 57.
121 Ibid., at 48.
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the trace of universality that is required tomake this claim.122 The task is to open up
the particularity of a decision, to show how it reaches beyond what it is, into what
it is always lacking, as the lawyer seeks to grasp the linkages it shares with other
positions:
[T]hedependenceof everyparticularity onauniversality that deﬁnes it, and constitutes
the ground from which it may experience itself as unfulﬁlled, devoid of some aspect
without which it cannot fully realize itself. Through attention to that “lack,” that
absence of what a particular feels it should possess in order to be full itself, focus
is directed to its universal aspect . . . By directing attention to that universality, the
particular is opened up, and its communal lien, its shared property or valuewith other
particularities, is revealed.123
Koskenniemi’s culture of formalism – and the theory of decision he draws upon
– is one that reminds us that the passage from undecidability to decision as being
political, through and through. His critical agenda is, again, deﬁned by the wish
to expose and question dominance and the distilleries of power, whilst ﬁnding a
way towards inclusion and a constant reach towards community. In exposing and
questioning the ‘lack’ or universalism within a particular position, his culture of
formalism challenges how each particular seeks dominance. And it seeks inclusion
in a pluralistic world by placing a particular position in correspondence with other
positions thathave a similar basis.124 As a cultural demand, it is aimedat ‘persuading
people to bracket their own sensibilities and learn openness for others’.125 But the
cultureof formalismisabovealla formofpraxis–atheoryofaction. It requiresasmall
but important act immediate to, and in, themoment of each decision, knowing that
the discipline’s construction and reproduction requires that these decisions need
to be made over and over, and each time anew. But it also ought to be seen a form
of praxis that emerges from the historical edges of the discipline, one that may be
learned again from a past. It is history that gives it ‘coherence and a distinct feel.’126
3.4. The Last Refuge: Ethics
So where does this leave the professional international lawyer? It would seem to
leave her on the precipice of a pragmatism that Koskenniemi often seems res-
istant to.127 This may be, as Outi Korhonen acutely points out, an acknowledge-
ment of the Weimar trauma that shapes the European condition.128 In his critical
readings of Kant he arguably seeks to ground an identity for the international
lawyer that does not deliver her into pure strategy and tactics – and the prag-
matism this often presumes. Speciﬁcally, he identiﬁes a subject who may apply
the high standards of his culture of formalism and uptake the task of the discip-
122 Laclau, supra note 116, at 48.
123 Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 505–6.
124 Koskenniemi, supra note 74, at 18.
125 Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 502.
126 Ibid., at 503 (emphasis original).
127 Ibid., at 516. See also M. Koskenniemi, ‘Formalism, Fragmentation, Freedom: Kantian Themes in Today’s
International Law’, (2007) 4No Foundations 7, at 23.
128 Korhonen, supra note 76, at 214–1919.
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line’s ‘moral regeneration’.129 He resuscitates Kant’s ‘moral politician’, as against
his ‘political moralist’, arguing that the cultural practice of international law lies
in the ‘crystallisation of personal virtue’.130 Ushering the international legal profes-
sional towards the attainment of a speciﬁcmindset andhighlymoralized sensibility.
Towards a:
spiritualperfection [that]preparesamindset fromwhichto judgetheworld inamanner
that aims for the all the virtues of the “innermorality of law”: honesty, fairness, concern
for others, the prohibition of deceit, injury and coercion.131
I do not think that Koskenniemi sees his call for ‘personal virtue’ as reducible to
any given set of moral norms. Much in the vein of Aristotle, I think he probably
appreciates its unwillingness to be pinned down and the diversity of its elemental
parts. But my concern lies elsewhere; within a productive tension produced by his
myriad of texts. This tension, simply put, is between the stabilized image of the
professional and an image that encourages the fragmented and destabilized.132 Or,
to put it in terms of his theoretical leanings; between his Kantian turn and his
appreciation of Laclau.
In regards Kant, the morally charged image of the individual which we obtain
fromKoskenniemi’s ‘menof 1873’would seem to deliver us into a ‘moral sensibility’
that survives and thrives absent the particularities of the situation in which any
decision is made. It exposes an image of a constituted individual who simply needs
to apply these characteristics to any given particular situation. Or put another way,
an authentic individualwith a given stabilized identitywhomay carry out the tasks of
the culture of formalism in any particular situation that may arise. The individual,
here, appears external to the competing rationalities of our fragmented world and
his internal moral and political constitution is able to bring out the universals con-
tained in their particularities. He is capable of bracketing his own preferences and
remaining open to the perspectives of others. Hannah Arendt, following Kant and
Aristotle, recognized thismoralized individual to also be the political beast. An actor
who had ‘the ability to see things not only from one’s own point of view but also
from the perspective of all those who happen to be present’, with this being ‘one
of the fundamental abilities of man as a political being insofar as it enables him to
orient himself in the public realm, in the common world’.133 For this individual,
freedom comes from being able to adjudge one’s situation, its competing particu-
larities and its possible universals, from the standpoint of some internalized moral
sensibility.
However, a tension materializes because this image of the professional interna-
tional lawyer emerges within the same context of Koskenniemi’s application of
129 Koskenniemi, supra note 74, at 16 (para. 32); see also M. Koskenniemi, ‘Constitutionalism as a Mindset:
Reﬂections on Kantian Themes About International Law and Globalization’, (2007) 8 Theoretical Inquiries in
Law 9, at 18.
130 Koskenniemi, supra note 87, at 414–15.
131 Koskenniemi, supra note 74, at 21 (para. 29).
132 We see this tension play out differently in two main texts: Koskenniemi, ‘Formalism, Fragmentation, Free-
dom’, supra note 127, at 23–34; and Koskenniemi, supra note 74, at 15–16.
133 H. Arendt, Between Past and Future (1968), 221.
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Laclau. This, in contrast, produces a fragmented and decentred subject. An indi-
vidual is only produced or momentarily stabilized, between a given situation in
which he must reside and the moment of decision.134 She may live between com-
peting vocabularies or within (and sometimes without) a structure of professional
argument, but this never determines her position or her moment of decision. But
the competing rationalities, vocabularies or particulars of our postmodern interna-
tional lawproduce the subject as she positions herselfwithin them.135 This innately
political animal136 never ﬁnds itself whole and can never be its own ground, but is
rather brieﬂy and ﬂeetingly constituted in the moment of every decision.137 This is
a subject who can only view herself as ever changing, fragmented between compet-
ing demands and constantly seeking freedom in every newmoment and every new
context. But if Koskenniemi’s understanding was arrested here then we would be
left on the precipice of pragmatism. Here the lawyer is situated and yet reﬂective,
capable of instrumentalizing a given moment of decision or given context, or the
perspective with which one appreciates a speciﬁc moment; small strategic acts are
the realization of an immediate freedom. But Koskenniemi’s culture of formalism,
and the moral and political sensibility upon which it rests, resists such an image of
the international lawyer.
The fragmented and destabilized image of the lawyer that we see is stabilized
within the cultural practice of law; it becomes a sort of ‘regulated madness’ if you
will. But even as the individual is embedded in this culture, she remains distinct.
She may be located in the moments between situation and decision, but is able to
brieﬂy separate herself from the grounds of her own construction. She is capable
of incorporating the particular claims of others, of an openness of perspective,
and of knowing those places in the world that garner despair and those that may
give pleasure. She becomes what Pierre Schlag has referred to as the ‘relatively
autonomous self’.138
Koskenniemi’s willingness to seek refuge in a project of moral regeneration and
the ‘cultivation of virtue’139 seeks to inﬂuence this briefmomentwhere his image of
the individual stands alone and impartial. In thismoment of commitment, Kosken-
niemi attempts to bring prudence to critique, to sustain a politics where critique may
run out of steamand effect. His idea of a political andmoral sensibility is premised on
a ‘reproachful attitude, composedof suffering, contemptandrageagainst everything
that has power’,140 but with the learned lesson that power’s distilleries cannot be
escaped and that critique cannot fail to collaborate. But as it reaches towards a col-
134 E. Laclau,New Reﬂections on the Revolution of our Time (1990), 60.
135 ‘[W]e do simply have subject positions within the structure, but also the subject as an attempt to ﬁll these
structural gaps. That is why we do not have just identities but, rather, identiﬁcation.’ Laclau, supra note 116, at
210.
136 Laclau, supra note 134, at 61 (‘any subject is, by deﬁnition, political’).
137 ‘Thuseverydecisionprocesswithanaspirationtoinclusivenessmustconstantlynegotiateitsownboundaries
as it is challenged by new claims or surrounded by new silences.’ Koskenniemi, supra note 4, at 508.
138 P. Schlag, ‘“Le Hors de Texte, C’est Moi”: The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction’, (1990)
11 Cardozo Law Review 1631, at 1667–8.
139 Koskenniemi, ‘Formalism, Fragmentation, Freedom’, supra note 127, at 24.
140 Sloterdijk, supra note 57, at xxxiv. See also Koskenniemi, supra note 87.
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lective conscience, reaching into the language of moral rectitude, is it not simply
a form of self-massaging for the individual lawyer? Perhaps it can only remain as
a persistent form of therapy? Whatever one’s position, Koskenniemi wishes the
individual to see that both her cultural history is deﬁned by a speciﬁc morality and
that the potential of her agency lies in cultivating this lineage. At the foundation of
this image of the international lawyer is a brooding and entirely repressed nostalgia.
Perhaps we are left with Richard Rorty’s ‘liberal ironist’?141
But to what extent does this image of the international lawyer’s agency enable or
incapacitate her? Koskenniemi has always abandoned critique at the precise point
that it canno longer provide effect, or a formof collaboration and collectiveness. But
it remainshighlyquestionable, justas itwastoMaxWeber,whethersurrenderingthe
individual to a form of liberal humanism is at all an effective strategy. Baudrillard’s
counterpoint is no doubt pertinent:
The effects of moral conscience, of collective conscience are entirely mediated effects,
and one can read in the therapeutic ardour with which we try to resuscitate this
conscience, how little life it retains.142
The conditions inwhichKoskenniemiundertakeshis project ofmoral regeneration,
and the avenues through which he makes claims to freedom, may tinge his project
with a sense of utopianism. But to the extent that it overestimates the capacity of
imagination, and of cultivated virtue, it may be considered with scepticism. Is this
merely a question of manning the last refuge? Koskenniemi is all too aware, like
Sartre before him, that ‘freedom is also a way to govern human beings’.143 To invest
it in virtue as the last refuge against false promises andpossibilities is perhapswhere
Koskenniemi’s nostalgia and utopianismmeet.
4. CONCLUSION
Michel Foucault famously spoke of the ‘author’, describing him as not merely the
author of his ownwork, but one that has ‘produced something else: the possibilities
and rules for the formation of other texts’.144 The signiﬁcance of From Apology to
Utopia and The Gentle Civilizer lies not in the intricacies of its text or the status
of its author, but rather in its intertextuality. Namely, how they and Koskenniemi
enable and shape other texts within our discipline. In undertaking an inquiry into
the subject, I have sought an entirely different approach to both Koskenniemi and
David Kennedy;145 one enmeshed in the intellectual vehicles of a given text and the
text’s strategies of containment, i.e., exposingwhat it does not let us see, but depends
upon.
141 Rorty, supra note 81, at xv–xvi.
142 J. Baudrillard, La Transparence duMal: Essai sur les Phe´nome`nes Extreˆmes (1990), 97.
143 Koskenniemi, supra note 74, at 15 (para. 31).
144 M. Foucault, ‘What is anAuthor?’, in J. Faubion (ed.),Aesthetics,Method and Epistemology (R. Hurley and others
(tr.), 1998), 205, 217.
145 Kennedy’s is amore ethnographic approach, see D. Kennedy, ‘When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the
Box’, (2000) 32New York University Journal of Law and Politics 335.
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In Koskenniemi’s texts we ﬁnd a recursive belief in the potential of the inter-
national lawyer. It is not a dogmatic belief, even if it remains a constant. But as I
have attempted to show the images of the international lawyer we see through-
out his texts not only straddle various ways of thinking about the world (critical
reason/imagination; transcendent freedom/imminent freedom etc.), but the subject
is always strugglingwithcertain tensions thatdeﬁneher. Faith inourcapacitycomes
with a required humility.
But an important point remains: the images of the subject that you see in this
essay only appear as complete within Koskenniemi’s texts. Because these images –
of both the critic(al subject) and the pragmatic professional – are shaped through
their interaction with the multiple other images of the international lawyers with
the discipline, the international lawyer is always in the process of becoming. We are
constantly adjusting to rethinkour place, role and capabilitieswithin the discipline.
We do so aswe readKoskenniemi’s texts at different points in history and aswe read
themalongsideothercanonical texts; tobecomeaware thatwearedoingso, andhow,
is an important ﬁrst step towards re-imaging our role within today’s international
legal order. And the uncertainties, conﬂicts and tensions found in our social world
are not only found there; they are an integral part of how we ought to think of
ourselves. The small contribution of this article is to suggest that we need to be
willing to shake our own (critical) foundations, nomatter how deep they run. Even
if, and perhaps especially because, it is our identity – and our actions – at stake.
